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Abstract: Along the studies suggesting IMF to promote private capital ‡ows, this paper sheds light
on the links of banking crisis and sudden stops and provides suggestions which are ‡exible and
more speci…c for countries in various situations of sudden stops. In this overlapping generation
framework in an open economy with international credit markets, both the default risks of …rms’
loan repayment, and the possibilities of bank runs are considered. As a result, there are good and
bad equilibriums, depending on whether bank runs would occur in the lifetime. In the four bad
equilibrium discussed in the paper, sudden stops may be unnecessary or unavoidable coinside with
the expectation of bank runs, which may or may not occur as expected. There are bad equilibriums
in which sudden stops are unnecessary. These are the cases when IMF’s assistance could prevent
sudden stops, and the repayment to IMF’s short-term lending facilities can be guaranteed. In the
bad equilibriums when bank runs are unavoidable and when sudden stops cannot be prevented and
may last for a long period of time, it could be very costly to assist countries in such equilibrium
without certain policies becoming e¤ective. Assisting several countries under this circumstances all
together could jeopardize IMF’s situation. These …ndings are consistent with those in [Eichengreen,
Guptam and Mody (2006)], and the suggestions for countries in various situations are more speci…c.
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1 Introduction
One of the main functions of IMF is to assist its membership countries which su¤er the interruptions
on capital ‡ows (sudden stops). Eichengreen, Guptam and Mody (2006) …nd that a larger share
(around 50%) of sudden stops coincide with banking crisis, not currency crisis. They …nd that
sudden stops has no discemible impact on net FDIs, but its impact on port…lio capital ‡ow is
of 2% of GDP by using the three main measures of capital accounts: foreign direct investment,
portfolio investments, and other investment. This indicates that the impacts of banking crisis on
international capital ‡ows are crucial. It is important to focus not only on the portfolio capital
‡ows but also on the composition of capital ‡ows. The data related to international capital ‡ows,
however, are often the net ‡ows, which is di¢cult to decompose and limit the ability of empirical
studies to analyze further. As the banking crisis has occurred frequently, especially after 2007
…nancial crisis, an analytical/theoretical work is the way to go beyond the net ‡ows and to be able
to look insight how banking crisis and the sudden stops are linked togther, and to provide ‡exible
and speci…c assitance to help the countries in need more e¤ectively.
The main assitance provided by IMF for its membership countries is the short-term lending fa-
cility. To receive such facility, the countries in need will have to adopt IMF’s version of programmes
as well as related technical assistance provided by IMF. The short-term lending facility serves as
ex-ante insurance for IMF’s members. The bright side of such facility is to provide liquidity and to
avoid high payments. The down side of such facility is to induce moral hazard and adverse selection
problems, and the possibility of IMF’s own insolvency due to limited resources. For example, the
likelihood of IMF’s insolvency is high when there is multilateral assistance required.
The technical assistance provided by IMF and the programe to be adopted in the countries under
assistance have also raised concerns. The main reason behind technical assistance and programe
adoption is to ensure the repayment of countries under assistance. The concerns are related to
the ‡exibility of the programe, and the programe and the technical assistance shall be tailored for
each country’s special needs. For example, it is found that IMF seems to premature the capital
accounts libralization of the programmed countries [Joyce and Noy (2008)]. However, it has been
well-documented that it is possible that premature capital account liberalization could damage
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growth, especially for the countries without su¢cient …nancial deepening and without policies that
support such liberalization [van Hulten and Webber (2010), Saidi and Aloui (2010), Tirole (2002)].
Therefore, prematuring capital account liberalization, in some cases, may damage the country’s
growth and its sustainability, and worsen the country’s ability to repay the …nancial assistance
provided by IMF. This may explain part of the doubts on the e¤ectiveness of IMF’s program,
which is found work best for countries with strong fundamentals [Eichengreen, Guptam and Mody
(2006)].
To address these issues, I extend a three-period-lived overlapping generation in an open economy
with international credit markets. The role of the …nancial intermediaries is to serve as middlemen
in the debt market and in the equity market. Whether capital would ‡ow into the country depends
on the rates of return in the debt and the equity market relative to the other country. It is the
capital ‡ows to/from the debt and to/from the equity market forming the total capital ‡ows across
countries. The …nancial intermediaries could run when they fail to meet demand deposoits. The
…nancial intermediaries’ ability to repay the demand deposit depends on the …rms’ loan repayment,
which is under default risk.
There are good and bad equilibria. In good equilibrium, bank runs are not expected, not in
current generations’ lifetime, so no assistane from IMF is required. It is the bad equilibrium when
bank runs have occurred or are expected occur that required IMF’s assistance. In this model, I
demonstrate four bad equilibriums, in which sudden stops are unnecessary or non-avoidable, and
suggest policies and assistance of IMF that are e¤ective in helping the economy back to the good
equilibrium and in preventing IMF from jeporadizing itself. To be more speci…c, when the bank
runs are expected in the future periods, or in the current period but after repayments are made,
being the member of IMF and knowing the availability of IMF’s short-term lending facilities could
be su¢cient in preventing bank runs and sudden stops.
In the two cases when the bank runs have occurred and are expected to occur before repaying
the accounts, capital accout liberalization could worsen the outcome and the costs to assist such
countries could be very high. These are the cases in which bank runs and sudden stops are
not avoidable. Moreover, when bank runs involving possible moral hazard problems of …nancial
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intermediaires, it will be even more costly for IMF to assist, and it could jeopardize IMF’s situation
if several countries under such cirmcumstances request assistance. Therefore, it is important for
IMF to limit lending facilities to countries under such cricumstances, and to provoide more technical
assistance on policies before assisting further. More details are stated in the later sections.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 decribes the environment, followed by equilibrium
in Section 3. The suggested policies and what IMF could do to assist are discussed in Section 4
before conclusion and possible extension in Section 5.
2 THE MODEL
In this paper, I extend Bencivenga and Smith’s (1991) overlapping generation model to an open
economy, and allow for capital market imperfections, which are similar to Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997, 2002) and Boyd and Smith (1999) to examine the impacts of one country’s banking crisis on
another country’s composition of capital ‡ows. Departing from the basic results, I discuss di¤erent
cases with regard to capital account liberalization, …nancial deepening, and multi-countries, then
the possible ways to improve the e¢ciency of international capital markets, and how e¤ective IMF
can be potentially by being ‡exible with its programmes to di¤erent countries.
In the world economy, there are two countries, home and foreign countries, which have the same
populations, and the populations stay constant over time,  = ¤. Each country is composed by
households, …rms and …nancial intermediaries, and in each country, the credit market contains both
loan and the equity markets. Without losing generality, …nancial intermediaries are assumed to be
the only institutions with the access to invest in the credit market, and to receive returns from it.
The exclusive access to the credit market allows the …nancial intermediaries to serve as middlemen
between …rms and households since households have income to invest, and …rms have to raise funds
to produce by requesting loans or by issuing equities. Similar to households and …rms, the …nancial
intermediaries are maximizing its own pro…ts. To simplify the model, the possibilities of moral
hazard and adverse selection problems are excluded in this paper.
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2.1 Households
Each individual is born identical, and lives for three periods: young, middle-aged and old. At
di¤erent stages of life, each household commits on di¤erent activities, which may divide households
in di¤erent groups. To be more speci…c, each young is endowed with one unit of labour, and values
only the consumption at middle-aged (2+1) and at old (3+2). At the beginning of middle-aged,
each household learns its own type, either an investor or an entrepreneur, but not both. With
exogenous probability  (1¡ ), the individual turns to an investor (entrepreneur). The investors
and entrepreneurs are di¤erent in two aspects: the skills and the ways they spend the repayments
from their short-term accounts. In particular, the entrepreneurs have the skills to …nance projects
and to operate …rms to start production, but investors don’t own such skills. An investor would
decide whether to re-invest, and where to re-invest at his middle-aged while an entrepreneur would
start raising fund and operating a …rm. The information of each household’s type remains private.
The distribution of types, however, is known by the public. This give the utility function:
(2+1 3+2) = ¡
(2+1 + 3+2)¡

 (1)
where  =  for investors,  =  for entrepreneurs, and 0      1. This re‡ects
the possibilities that investors can be less impatient than entrepreneurs. Without having access
to the credit market, each household devotes its labour to production when young, earns income
and allocates its own income between di¤erent accounts o¤ered by the …nancial intermediaries to
…nance its own consumption throughout its own lifetime and to maximize its own lifetime utility.
At middle-aged, each household gets repayment from the short-term accounts and acts based on his
type. At old, while the entrepreneurs receive pro…ts from the …rm operation, the investors receive
returns from their investments via …nancial intermediaries.
The …nancial intermediaries o¤er all individuals both short-term and long-term accounts. While
the short-term accounts take one period to mature, the long-term accounts take two periods to
mature. There are two types of short-term accounts: saving and investment accounts, and only
one type of long-term accounts: term deposit accounts. For an account opened at period , an
saving account earns the net interest rate
¡

¢
at period  + 1, which is pre-determined by the
…nancial intermediaries when opening the account. An investment account earns the net return
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rate
¡
+1
¢
which is determined by the equity market at the beginning of the period +1 and repays
to the account owner, prior to each middle-aged learning its own type. A term deposit account
earns the net interest rate
¡

¢
, which is also pre-determined by the …nancial intermediaries at
period  when opening the account, and the returns will be repaid to the account owner at period
 + 2. An early liquidation of the term deposit account is possible but will be subject to a low
liquidation rate  , which is lowest rate among all accounts at that period, 

 
¡
  


¢
  .
At date , the allocation of each young’s income among di¤erent accounts o¤ered by the …nancial
intermediaries is as follows. The young places  ( 1) fraction of income in short-term accounts,
in which  ( 1) fraction is in investment accounts,
¡
1¡ 
¢
in saving accounts, and
¡
1¡ 
¢
in long term accounts. At date , each of the middle-aged is entitled to receive returns from his
short-term accounts  :
 ´
¡
1 + ¡1
¢

¡
1¡ 
¢
¡1 +
¡
1 + 
¢
 

¡1 (2)
At middle-aged, an investor is interested in re-investment to maximize the utility. Without
losing generality, it is assumed that the investors would evaluate the credit markets in both countries,
and focus on one country to re-invest, but not both1. If an investor feels indi¤erent in reinvestment
in both countries, s/he would reinvest in his/her domestic country. An investor, who decides to
invest in domestic (foreign) country, would place 
¡
¤
¢
fraction of his/her re-investment in
investment accounts, and
¡
1¡ 
¢ ¡
1¡ ¤
¢
fraction in saving accounts.
At date , given 2, an investor has options whether to reinvest (RI), and whether to liquidate
the long term accounts prematurely (EL). The returns of each option is as follows:
1One may consider relax this assumption and allow investors to invest in both countries, but thisdoes not change
the main results of this model.
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Table 1: The payo¤ for an investor
options newly create wealth at each date after consumption 2
RI EL   

+1
1  no 0 
¡
 ¡ 2
¢
+
¡
1 + ¡1
¢ ¡
1¡ 
¢
¡1
2 no no  ¡ 2
¡
1 + ¡1
¢ ¡
1¡ 
¢
¡1
3 no   +
¡
1 + ¡1
¢ ¡
1¡ 
¢
¡1 ¡ 2 0
4   0 
£
 +
¡
1 + ¡1
¢ ¡
1¡ 
¢
¡1 ¡ 2
¤

where  ´
£¡
1 + 
¢ ¡
1¡ 
¢
+
¡
1 + +1
¢

¤
. Note that not-to-reinvest means not to rein-
vest via …nancial intermediaries, and individuals always have the storage option. So 3+1 =
  +

+1 , the sum of newly created wealth after middle-aged consumption 2. The utility is
generated by 2 + 3+1. In other words, given 2, the option chosen by the investor implies
that 3+1 in that particular option is higher than all other options.
2.2 The …rms: the production and the roles in credit markets
The …rms are operated by entrepreneurs, as they own special skills of transforming output goods
to capital goods. These skills are granted to them after realizing their type as entrepreneurs. The
transformation between capital goods and output goods is one-to-one. The production requires both
capital goods () and labour () as inputs, and will take one period to complete. The production
is in the Cobb-Douglas form with constant return to scale: +1 =  
1¡
 , 0    1, where
 represents production technology, and +1 represents total output produced.
It takes sunk cost  to operate a …rm, and the variable cost, wage, has to be paid by the end of
date , when is slightly prior to the completion time of the production, early date + 1. In other
words, an entrepreneur will have to prepare  +  at minimum to start the production, which
is larger than an entrepreneur’s wealth at date  ( ). All entrepreneurs, who wish to operate a
…rm, will have to borrow
 =  + ¡
¡
 ¡ ¡
¢
 (3)
where  is the collateral required to obtain loan, which is subtracted from the entrepreneur’s wealth
and will be returned after loan repayment is repaid. There are two ways an entrepreneur could
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borrow the fund. One way is to obtain loan from …nancial intermediaries in the debt market, and
the other is to raise fund by issuing equities in the equity market. It is assumed that both ways are
limited to domestic credit markets, the debt market and the equity market. One-period production
implies that it is short-term fund the entrepreneurs require, not long term fund.
In the debt market, the source of loanable fund is limited to the sum of depositors’ saving
accounts at date . There exists credit rationing in the economy. That is, only a fraction ()
of entrepreneurs could obtain the loan from the …nancial intermediaries, called debt-…nance entre-
preneurs. The rest (1¡ ) of entrepreneurs will have to raise fund in the equity market, called
equity-…nance entrepreneurs. The debt contract is o¤ered by the …nancial intermediaries with
determined loan rate  . An acceptable contract requires
³
1 + 
´
 · +1 (4)
There is uncertainty on the success of the production. With the probability  (1¡ ), the pro-
duction succeeds (fails). A successful production would generate pro…t +1¡
¡
1 + 
¢
 for an
entrepreneur, but a failed production will produce zero output and leave the loan unpaid. The
true state of the production is observable costlessly by the entrepreneur who owns the …rm. All
agents other than entrepreneurs will have to pay to verify the true state of the production. To
reduce the veri…cation costs, the …nancial intermediaries will verify the production state only in
the case of any non-repaid loan. Once do the veri…cation occur, the …nancial intermediaries will
take all …nal output away. Therefore all entrepreneurs always report the true state. Moreover,
it is assumed that all capital goods used in production depreciate at the rate . Therefore, the
entrepreneur has the residual of capital goods (1¡ ) 
¡
1 + 
¢
 which cannot be sold, but
can be self-consumed. Therefore, the expected payo¤ of a debt-…nance entrepreneur is
¦+1 = 
£
+1 ¡
¡
1 + 
¢
 + + (1¡ )
¤
+ (1¡ ) (1¡ ) (5)
The equity market di¤er from the debt market in several aspects. There is no collateral
requirement, and no credit rationing for entrepreneurs in the equity market. Also, the return
rate to the equity-holders
¡
+1
¢
is determined by the equity market at the period of production
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completion. This gives the expected payo¤ of a equity-…nance entrepreneur:
¦+1 = 
£
+1 ¡
¡
1 ++1
¢
 + (1¡ )
¤
+ (1¡ ) (1¡ ) (6)
So the problem faced by a debt-…nance entrepreneur is to choose  and  to maximize equation
(5) subject to equation (3). The problem faced by an equity-…nance entrepreneur is similar to
that of debt-…nance entrepreneur, except for  = 0, and for  replaced by 

+1, so the amount
to borrow by an equity-…nance entrepreneur  =  +  ¡
¡
 ¡
¢
is less than that of a
debt-…nance entrepreneur
¡

¢
The full employment assumption gives the labour market clearing condition,  = 1 (1¡ ).
This gives 
 =
1
1¡ 
·

 + 
¸1(1¡)
 =
1
1¡ 
"

+1 + 
#1(1¡)
(7)
 =
1
1¡ 
"
 (1¡ )¡
1 + 
¢

#1 ·

 + 
¸1(1¡)
 (8)
 =
1
1¡ 
"
 (1¡ )¡
1 + +1
¢

#1 "

+1 + 
#1(1¡)
 =
"
 (1¡ )¡
1 + 
¢
#·

 + 
¸(1¡)
  =
"
 (1¡ )¡
1 + +1
¢
#"

+1 + 
#(1¡)
 (9)
Note that the wage has to be paid at date  before realizing +1 for equity entrepreneurs. So the
equity …nanced entrepreneurs would form expectations of +1, 

+1, when hiring workers. In the
case of +1 = 

 , the values 

 = 

 , 

 = 

 , and 

 = 

 . This is the case
when no labour mobility occurs and when all inputs are identical across …rms. By substituting
equations (7)-(9) to equations (5) and (6), one could obtain entrepreneurs’ expected capital gains
in operating …rms. Note that if the expected capital gains of an entreprenur, whether via debt-or
equity-…nance, are su¢ciently high, then all entrepreneurs would borrow to operate …rms. That is
when ¦+1 ¸ 2 + 

¡
  +

+1
¢
, and 
¦+1 ¸ 2 + 

¡
  +

+1
¢
, where
 = ( 0) = (¡), and  = (1 0) = (¡).
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2.3 The credit markets
The two credit markets are, the debt and the equity markets, where …nancial intermediaries play
an important role in both. The saving accounts provided by the …nancial intermediaries are for the
debt market, and the investment accounts are for the equity market. Based on the assumptions of
this model, it is the saving accounts and the long term accounts the demand deposits, which would
have the …nancial intermediaries subject to run. The role of …nancial intermediaries in the debt
market is to o¤er the entrepreneurs the loan contracts, and to o¤er the young households and the
investors the deposit contracts for the saving accounts and the long term accounts. The role of
…nancial intermediaries in the equity market, however, is simply to serve as a channel to provide
the fund in the investment accounts to the equity market for equity-…nance entrepreneurs.
Due to the demand deposits, the …nancial intermediaries would manage the saving and the long
term accounts with caution while choosing the return rate to attract depositors and to maximize
their pro…ts. Let  (1¡ 
¤
 ) denote the fraction of domestic (foreign) investors, who choose domestic
…nancial intermediaries to reinvest, let  and 

 be the fraction of the long term accounts in which
the …nancial intermediaries and the households decide to liquidate immaturely, respectively. The
problem faced by the domestic …nancial intermediaries at date  is to choose  , 

 , 

 and 


to maximize the expected payo¤ ¦ :
¦ =
8
>>>><
>>>>>:
[ ¡  (1¡ )]
+
£
(1¡ )
£

¡
1 + ¡1
¢
¡1 + (1¡ )¡1
¤
¡
¡
1 + ¡1
¢
¡1
¤
+
¡
 ¡ 


¢ ¡
1¡ ¡2
¢ ¡
1 + ¡1
¢
¡1
+
¡
1¡ ¡2
¢ £¡
1¡ ¡1
¢ ¡
1 + ¡2
¢
¡
¡
1¡ ¡1
¢ ¡
1 + ¡2
¢¤
¡2
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>>>>=
>>>>>;
 (10)
where  ´ 
¡
1¡ 
¢
+
¡
1¡ 
¢

¡
 ¡ 2
¢
+(1)¤ (1¡ ¤ )
³
1¡ ¤
´
¤
¡
¤ ¡ 
¤
2
¢
is the aggregate saving account in the …nancial intermediaries at date . the …rst term is the sav-
ing accounts of the young’s and the domestic and the foreign investors, which are loan out to the
middle-aged entrepreneurs. The second term is both the loan repayment and the collateral from
unpaid loan, which are used to repay the depositors’s matured saving accounts. The third term is
early liquidated long term accounts, and the fourth is the matured long term accounts at date .
The details of the capital ‡ows are shown in Figure 2.
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There are several strategies the …nancial intermediaries adopting in managing various accounts.
As the strategies is not the focus, I will keep it as simple as possible in this model. That is, to
have the newly opened saving accounts to …nance the new loan, to have the matured loan to …nance
the matured saving accounts, and to have the returns and the early liquidation of the long term
accounts to …nance the mature long term accounts and to serve as backup in case of any shortage
in repaying the matured saving accounts and long-term accounts. Since all newly open long term
accounts will be located into long term investment, the term
¡
1¡ 
¢
 cancel out each other in
equation (10). Based on this strategy, the liquidity constraints of the …nancial intermediaries are:
 ¸  (1¡ )  (11)
h

³
1 + ¡1
´
¡1 + (1¡ )¡1
i
(1¡ )  ¸
¡
1 + ¡1
¢
¡1 (12)
¡
 ¡ 


¢ ¡
1¡ ¡2
¢ ¡
1 + ¡1
¢
¡1 (13)
+
¡
1¡ ¡2
¢ £¡
1¡ ¡1
¢ ¡
1 + ¡2
¢
¡
¡
1¡ ¡1
¢ ¡
1 + ¡2
¢¤
¡2
¸ 0
where equations (11)-(13) are for newly opened saving accounts, for matured saving accounts, and
for matured long term accounts, respectively.
Let  ´ ¤ denote the real exchange rate at period , where  (
¤
 ) represents the real value
of the domestic (foreign) currency. The incentive constraints to attract both domestic and foreign
investors are:
¡
1 + 
¢ ¡
1¡ 
¢
+
¡
1 ++1
¢
 ¸ (1)
£¡
1 + ¤
¢ ¡
1¡ ¤
¢
+
¡
1 +¤+1
¢
¤
¤
(14)
¡
1 + 
¢ ¡
1¡ ¤
¢
+
¡
1 + +1
¢
¤ ¸ ()
£¡
1 + ¤
¢ ¡
1¡ 
¢
+
¡
1 +¤+1
¢

¤
(15)
Note that the foreign investors’ portfolio decisions on reinvestment may di¤er from that of domestic
investors. Similarly, based on di¤erent return rates of the debt and the equity markets in the foreign
country, the domestic investors’ portfolio decisions may be di¤erent in the foreign country.
At date , the debt market clearing condition is when equality holds in equation (11), and the
equity market clearing condition is
 =  (1¡ ) (1¡ )  (17)
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where  ´  

 + 

 
¡
 ¡ 2
¢
+ (1)¤ (1¡ ¤ )
¤
 
¤
¡
¤ ¡ 
¤
2
¢
shows the
aggregate amount in the investment accounts. The equity market at date +1 after receiving returns
from the equity-…nance entrepreneurs determines +1. In order to attract fund investing in the
equity market, +1 has to be su¢ciently high. Meanwhile, the expected payo¤ of equity-…nance
entrepreneurs have to be as better o¤ as the debt-…nance entrepreneurs.

¡
1 + +1
¢
=  (1¡ ) (1¡ )
¡


+1
¢
(18)
¸
¡
1 + 
¢

where  represents the fraction of output extracted to repay the equity holders by the equity-…nance
entrepreneurs who experience successful production.
3 EQUILIBRIUM
There are good equilibria and bad equilibria in this model. The good equilibrium is when bank
runs are not expected to occur, at least not in the lifetime of the current generations, and the bad
equilibrium is when bank runs either occurred or are expected to occur during the lifetime of the
current generations. In good equilibrium, IMF’s assistance is not required. It is the economy
in bad equilibrium when might require the assistance from IMF. In this model, there are several
bad equilibrium, which may cause unnecessary or unavoidable sudden stops. I will describe each
equilibrium in this section, and leave the discussion of what IMF could possibly do to assist to the
next section.
Good Equilibrium In good equilibrium, both saving accounts and the long term accounts will
be paid o¤. According to Table 2, option 3 is worse than option 4 and option 2, which is worse than
option 1 if  ¸ 1. Therefore, all investors choose option 1 (reinvestment, no early liquidation)
 = 0 when
¡
1 + 
¢
¸ 
¡
1 + ¡1
¢
, and
¡
1 + 
¢
¸ ¤
¡
1 + ¡1
¢
. As a result,
 = 0, and 
 =  [equation (13)] to ensure  is su¢ciently high and to discourage
premature liquidation. Equation(12), (14), and (18) give
³
1 + 
´
¸
" ¡
1 + 
¢

(1¡ )
¡ (1¡ )
#
 (19)
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¡
1 + 
¢
¸
n
(1)
h¡
1 + ¤
¢³
1¡ ¤
´
+
¡
1 +¤+1
¢
¤
i
¡
¡
1 + +1
¢

o
³
1¡ 
´  (20)
¡
1 + +1
¢
=
 (1¡ ) (1¡ )
¡


+1
¢

¸
¡
1 + 
¢µ

¶
 (21)
Since the amount of pro…t, which the equity …nance entrepreneurs would share to their equity-
holders, is limited, the more investment in the equity market may reduce the rate of returns +1
despite   

 .
Bad equilibrium A: bank runs have occurred unexpected In the bad equilibrium, bank
runs either have occurred or are expected to occur. In the case when bank runs have occurred,
as the …nancial intermediaries are the middlemen for both the debt and the equity market in this
model, the banks runs may cause both the debt and the equity market closed down. If bank
runs occurred before repaying the short-term accounts to depositors, the middle aged entrepreneurs
cannot operate new …rms to hire the young, the young have no income to deposit, and the investors
have no fund to reinvest. This is probably the one of worst scenarios as everyone is worse o¤,
except the entrepreneurs payo¤s may remain the same or higher depending on whether the loan is
repaid. This is the moral hazard problems of …nancial intermediaries. In this case, sudden stops
is not avoidable, and could last for a long period of time.
Bad equilibrium B: bank runs are expected at the current period and after repay-
ments are made In the bad equilibrium when bank runs are expected at the current period,
the depositors would rush to the …nancial intermediaries to withdraw. If this expectation of bank
runs is after the middle aged receive the repayments of their short-term accounts, the middle aged
investors would then choose option 3, liquidate all their long terms accounts,  =  = 1 and
reinvest in the foreign …nancial intermediaries.
In this case, the middle aged investors are worse o¤ than good equilibrium. The middle-aged
entrepreneurs would not operate …rms2 and invest like the investors, and are even worse o¤. When
2One may argue that the entrepreneurs could still operate …rms. However, the expectation of bank runs at any
time could mean bank runs after the …nancial intermediaries receiving the collaterals or equities but before obtaining
the loan or the fund. Therefore, in general, the entrepreneurs would prefer not operating the …rms.
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…rms are not operated, the young have nowhere to o¤er labour supply and earn income, and will
the ones su¤er the most. The old entrepreneurs utility may remains the same, as the expectation
is after the completion of production. In this case, however, as long as the …nancial intermediaries
follow its strategy strictly–only liquidate long-term accounts upon household request,  = ,
there may not be bank runs as expected. However, following by the panic of the middle-aged
investors and entrepreneurs, unnecessary sudden stops may occur. Such sudden stops, although
unnecessary, may have long term e¤ects on the current young generation, who have nothing to begin
with when turning middle aged, either becoming investors or entrepreneurs.
Bad Equilibrium C: bank runs are expected at the current period and before repay-
ments are made When bank runs are expected at the current period and before the completion
of production by the old entrepreneurs, the panic may result in bank runs right away, as the case
stated in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and most studies on bank runs. This is when the …nancial
intermediaries have not yet got loan repayments and have to liquidate the long term accounts pre-
maturely to respond to withdrawals, which is insu¢cient, and the expectation of bank runs would
come true, only a matter of time. The existence foreign investors are joining the line, and would
speed up bank runs. The results would be similar to that demonstrated in Diamond and Dybvig
(1983).
Depending on the rank in line, the agents may or may not get the repayments. Even if getting
the repayments, as the withdrawals occur before the mature time of the short term accounts, the rate
of return is far less than one. The joining of foreign investors would reduce the expected repayment
even further. Thus, the expected repayment in this open economy is worse than that in the closed
economy and the economy without capital account liberalization. The middle-aged investors and
entrepreneurs are worse o¤ than the case of bad equilibrium B. Both the debt market and the equity
market would shut down, and sudden stops are not avoidable. The old entrepreneurs may be better
o¤ since nowhere to repay loan or equity holders and
¡
1 + ¡1
¢
¡1  ¡1. Compared to bad
equilibrium B, operating …rms becomes more costly for entrepreneurs in this case, and without the
debt and the equity markets, the entrepreneurs would reinvest in the foreign country like investors.
Therefore, no production, no work, and no income for the young. The unavoidable sudden stops
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may have long term impacts for the economy.
Bad equilibrium D: bank runs are expected at the future period(s) When bank runs
are expected in the next period +1, the direct impact is the current young will keep the income in
the storage. The middle-aged investors would take all repayments to invest in the foreign country
if  ¸ 1. There will be no loanable fund to provide to the entrepreneurs, and no entrepreneurs
would seek the …nancial intermediaries for loan. The role of …nancial intermediaries as middlemen
has been abandoned after the repayments to the depositors in this case, but the good news is no
bank runs as a result.
In this case, the possibility for both the debt and the equity markets to exist would require the
entrepreneurs and the young to locate each other and to construct contracts or to issue equities
directly. However, as discussed in the literature of banking theory, the dual monitoring costs and
search costs would increase. So the expected payo¤ for both the entrepreneurs and the young are
worse than that in the good equilibrium, and there may be sudden stops in the coming period +1
but only temporary. However, in this case, the entrepreneurs are operating …rms, which provide
income to the young, so the outcome although not as good as good equilibrium, but is better than
bad equilibrium A, B, and C.
4 POLICIES and WHAT IMF COULD DO TO ASSIST
It is only the economy in bad equilibrium that would require the assistance from IMF. In the previ-
ous section, I discuss four bad equilibrium, in which sudden stops might occur, whether temporary,
unnecessary, or non-avoidable. In this section, I will focus on the cases that really require IMF’s
assistance followed by the ways that may be more e¤ective without jeopardize IMF’s state.
As the economy in bad equilibrium D is the mildest case, I will start at this case and move
back to equilibrium C, B and A. In bad equilibrium D, the economy still functions well and no
bank runs occur as expected. The only concern is that the expectation of bank runs in the future
period causes individuals abandon the …nancial intermediaries as middlemen. What is required is
the ways to reverse the expectations of bank runs. One of them is having the membership of IMF,
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which acts as the ex-ante insurance. With the availability of IMF’s short-term lending facilities,
the individuals of the country may not expect bank runs. IMF may not need to actual lend to the
country to prevent sudden stops.
For countries in bad equilibrium B, despite no bank runs, it is the distrust on the …nancial
intermediaries that causes entrepreneurs not operating …rms and unnecessary sudden stops, which
may have long term impacts on the current young and the economy. What is required in this case is
the policies and assistance from IMF that could restore individual’s trust on …nancial intermediaries.
The policies that could be e¤ective in this case are to ensure the …nancial intermediaries follow the
strategy strictly–no premature liquidation without depositor’s request, and to prevent moral hazard
problems of …nancial intermediaries. To be more speci…c, in this case, it is important to have
policies that regulate …nancial intermediaries to provide funds to the entrepreneurs after obtaining
the collateral. Having such policies in the package plus the short-term lending facilities provided
by IMF, the entrepreneurs would operate …rms, which could provide jobs to the young, and the
economy could be back to the good equilibrium, and sudden stops are prevented. In this case, even
if the short-term lending facilities is used, it will be mild and the repayment to IMF is guaranteed.
The countries in bad equilibrium C are worse than those in equilibrium B. In equilibrium C,
bank runs do occur and sudden stops are not avoidable. The entrepreneurs are either having no
repayment or have far less repayment from their short-term accounts, so if they do want to operate
…rms, they cannot do so since nothing to provide as collateral and no debt or equity market to locate
the fund. So the economy ends up without …rms, jobs and income for the young. What is required
to have policies that have records of the loan contracts and enforceable by the authorities, should
the bank runs, and the policies that prevent moral hazard problems of the …nancial intermediaries.
In particular, the policies that would enforce the …nancial intermediaries return loan repayment to
the saving account depositors before bank runs. In this case, IMF’s assistance is required as such
policies may not be su¢cient, since both the debt and the equity markets closed down after bank
runs. The assistance required by IMF is not only to construct policies required but also to provide
liquidity to the entrepreneurs via the short term lending facilities to operate …rms, which can provide
jobs to the young. After young having jobs and income, the policies that help entrepreneurs and
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people who own the fund to locate each other and start rebuilding the debt and equity markets
without …nancial intermediaries, then moved to the economy with …nancial intermediaries. The
cost involved could be large and risky, and it may take a long period of time to restore the debt
the equity markets. If there are several countries in this equilibrium request such assistance from
IMF, this is when IMF could jeopardize itself.
The countries in bad equilibrium A is even worse than the countries in equilibrium C as the
repayments to middle-aged is zero. The main cause of this bad equilibrium is the moral hazard
problems of the …nancial intermediaries, so all policies suggested for equilibrium C would apply here.
The costs via short-term lending facilities to assist such countries could be far more that involved
in assisting countries in equilibrium C. Without the policies starting working well, the lending to
such countries could be endless, and the repayment may not guaranteed. What IMF could do
in response to the request from such countries could be to insist policies legislated and enforced,
to provide liquidity to a certain point, and not to continue lending until the policies becoming
e¤ective.
5 CONCLUSION & EXTENSIONS
The advantages of overlapping generation framework allow this paper to look insight the links of
banking crisis and sudden stops and provided ‡exible and speci…c suggestions which could help
the IMF and the countries in need. IN particular, when the bank runs are expected any time
after repayments to the accounts, being the member of IMF and knowing the availability of IMF’s
short-term lending facilities could be su¢cient in preventing bank runs and sudden stops. However,
when the bank runs have occurred and are expected to occur before repaying the accounts, capital
account liberalization could worsen the outcome, and the costs to assist such countries could be
very high. In these two cases, both bank runs and sudden stops are not avoidable. Moreover,
when bank runs involving possible moral hazard problems of …nancial intermediaries, it will be even
more costly for IMF to assist, and it could jeopardize IMF’s situation if several countries under
such circumstances request assistance. Therefore, it is important for IMF to limit lending facilities
to countries under such circumstances, and to provide more technical assistance on policies before
16
assisting further.
There are several limitation of this paper, which can be extended in the future. The direct
extension is to release the direct access to the equity market to individuals, so bank runs won’t
result in equity market to close down as well. Such relaxation, on one hand, may promote private
capital ‡ows in the case of bank runs. On this other hand, it may increase the fragility of equity
market, especially for countries with capital account liberalization. This may require an analytical
work to address these concerns.

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